The fallacy of composition in financial regulations
May 20, 2023
The fallacy of composition in financial regulations is that if all the banks are prudent, keeping all their individual micro risks under control, the entire financial system is safe.
On the perils of regulating an infinitely complex financial system
May 17, 2023
The financial system is infinitely complex, so the supervisors can only patrol a small part of it, why it is so hard to regulate finance effectively.
Buffers or shock absorption in regulating finance
April 15, 2023
There are two main approaches to macroprudential regulations. The first is the current one of identifying all risks and using them to build buffers against shocks. Alternatively, shock absorption can be used to boost resilience. Which is better?
The case against aggressive government action on crypto
March 29, 2023
The financial regulators have recently taken an active interest in cryptocurrencies, more than a decade after their law enforcement counterparts did. So why are they doing this now, and what will the consequences be? Regulators feel compelled to respond due to political pressures and their actions may backfire.
What Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse tell us about financial regulations
March 25, 2023
The downfall of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse has exposed failures in how we regulate the financial system. This column argues that the problems we now see in the system have arisen because the financial authorities have been trying to do the impossible: maintain growth while keeping inflation under control and financial stability high. The best way forward would be to focus on shock absorption and moral hazard, not the current approach of buffers and risk measurements.
Lessons from the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank
March 15, 2023
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank shows that banks still pose risks. Are they systemic? While it is unlikely that the failure of SVB will lead to a crisis, it shows us that the financial system is much more fragile than the public had been led to believe.
Risk and scientific socialism
February 11, 2023
The way we manage financial risk has a lot in common with the old concept of scientific socialism. The modern-day riskometer is pseudoscientific, and the increased reliance on it leads to disastrous systemic risk.
Is risk a fate or a choice?
December 15, 2022
The prevailing view seems to be that financial risk is a fate not a choice. Even ChatGPT thinks so. As we manage our financial affairs, we are in control. Risk is a choice. True?
The magic of riskometers
December 10, 2022
The way financial risk is measured is by a device I have called the riskometer. It is a fantastic thing, plunge it into the bowels of the City of London and out pops a single accurate measurement of risk. Magical. But does it work in practice?
The beginning of the end for cryptocurrencies
November 29, 2022
Cryptocurrencies have enjoyed a remarkable run from obscurity to a trillion dollar valuation in just over a decade. This column argues, however, that they have now reached the beginning of the end as the factors fuelling their success have come to a standstill. While crypto currencies are not much of a public concern, they will leave a fine legacy by forcing much-needed reform on the financial system.
How to manipulate risk forecasts and not get caught
November 19, 2022
It is easy to manipulate risk forecasts. If your regulator or compliance officer sets a risk target you don't like, just tell them what they want to hear while continuing doing what you want.
Perceived and actual risk
November 12, 2022
Risk, Models, Endogenous risk
Perceived risk is risk predicted by models, and actual risk is the fundamental underlying risk. We measure perceived risk and care about the actual risk. Those two are negatively correlated with interesting consequences.
The illusion of control
November 7, 2022
Crises, Endogenous risk
Global macroprudential and microprudential regulatory changes since 2008 have been designed to make a repeat of a systemic crisis much less likely. This column argues that one-size-fits-all regulation constrains market response to short-term fluctuations in measured risk. Without more diversity in regulation, this will increase the likelihood of systemic crises in future.
The McNamara fallacy and the financial Authorities
November 5, 2022
We missed the excessive build-up of risk before 2007 despite having all the numbers and models right in front of us. Now we have doubled down on models and numbers. Have the Authorities fallen for the McNamara fallacy?
Climate risk and financial risk
October 22, 2022
Systemic risk and climate change strongly affect each other. Unfortunately, a lot of research promising to tell how, does no such thing. Because of a fundamental misunderstanding of what risk is and how financial institutions operate.
October 21, 2022
Democracy works. The political turmoil in Britain has showed us how to get rid of incompetent and ideological leaders. It would not have been as smooth in certain other countries.
Who believes risk can be measured?
October 8, 2022
I have long argued that risk, especially extreme risk, cannot be measured. A lot of people disagree. Who are they?
What do we want to get out of regulations?
October 6, 2022
Financial regulations are vital. But do they give us what we need?
Systemic risk in 2008 and today
October 1, 2022
The perceived wisdom maintains that systemic risk was much higher in 2008 than it is today. I am not so sure.
Why the risk you measure is probably not the risk you care about
September 26, 2022
The risk we measure is usually not the risk we care about. Why and does it matter?
Choosing a numerical programming language for economic research: Julia, MATLAB, Python or R
August 13, 2022
Economic researchers can choose between four general purpose programming languages – Julia, MATLAB, Python, and R. This column evaluates the four, comparing and contrasting the various language features and making recommendations in particular use cases.
Review of "Nuclear folly, a new history of the Cuban missile crisis" and lessons for financial policy
August 12, 2022
Systemic risk, War
I just read "Nuclear folly, a new history of the Cuban missile crisis" by Serhii Plokhy. It’s an excellent book, not only telling the story from the Soviet side for the first time but also with many lessons for those interested in central banks and financial stability.
Crypto and financial stability
July 14, 2022
Cryptocurrencies, Systemic risk
A lot of turmoil in crypto. Does that mean crypto markets should be regulated? The turmoil is driven by violent price volatility, exposing weaknesses in technology and business models. Any financial stability impact arises from that. Fundamental to crypto volatility is the nature of demand and supply. A lot of investors sell, so the price drops. Why do they sell?
Who is to blame for the rising systemic risk?
July 6, 2022
I ran a poll on LinkedIn and Twitter, asking who is to blame for the rising systemic risk. The overwhelming majority on both agreed. The options were: Covid, Putin, the central banks and it’s just bad luck. The LinkedIn poll attracted 106 votes and the Twitter one 23.
Bitcoin isn't much of a macro hedge
June 25, 2022
Bitcoin is often sold as protection against adverse macroeconomic outcomes. This column argues that this depiction as a macro hedge does not stand up to scrutiny. Recent events — from Covid and inflation to war — provide a window into what sort of asset bitcoin actually is. It if were a true macro hedge, bitcoin would be positively correlated with macroeconomic uncertainty. Instead, it acts as a leveraged bet for speculators. And unlike gold, which has been trusted as a macro hedge for millennia, bitcoin requires access to electricity and the internet, precarious services in times of turmoil.
Why does it always seem like the world is (almost) coming to an end?
June 22, 2022
Terrible events dominate the news. There was an endless stream of bad news when I was listening to Today on BBC4 this morning. But are things really that bad? Recession. Inflation. War. Nuclear war. The news was terribly depressing, and all the experts BBC talked to said things were getting worse. We also had Larry Summers give a talk on Monday that was deeply depressing.
Resiliency or shock absorption?
May 11, 2022
The way the financial authorities address threats to financial stability is by resilience. But is that the right way? Might it be better to emphasise shock absorption instead?
Cryptocurrencies and the war in Ukraine
March 11, 2022
The cryptocurrency exchanges have only done what is legally required of them when sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, unlike the mainstream financial institutions whose restrictions on the Russians generally exceeds what is required by law. This column argues that the implications for the future of cryptocurrencies will be considerable.
Sanctions, war, and systemic risk in 1914 and 2022
March 10, 2022
The Western countries have sanctioned Russia in a way not applied to any globally integrated major power in over a century, ever since 1914. This column argues that there are lessons to be learned from the 1914 systemic crisis and that high inflation and government debt will make it difficult to contain a crisis today if one emerges.
How global risk perceptions affect economic growth
January 13, 2022
Risk, Regulations, Endogenous risk
The relationship between financial risk and economic growth is complex. This column finds that perceptions of high risk unambiguously harm growth, while perceived low risk has an initial positive impact, which eventually turns negative. Global risk has a stronger effect on growth than local risk, via its impact on capital flows, investment, and debt-issuer quality, challenging monetary policy independence.
The central banks' Catch-22
November 19, 2021
Inflation is exploding. The reason is the central banks doing what it takes to keep the economy going. Now they are damned if they do and damned if they don't. Year on year inflation in the United States is 6.2%, 4.5% in Germany and only 3.8% here in the United Kingdom.
The logical fallacy at the heart of the intellectual case for Brexit
October 1, 2021
Half a decade after the Brexit vote, it is clear that the classical liberal intellectual case for Brexit has a fatal flaw. There were many reasons for voting Brexit, and as these have been rehashed endlessly, I won’t do so here.
The lifetime of code
September 26, 2021
How far into the future should we be able to execute computer code written today? Next month, next year next decade or next century? My choice of a language depends on the answer to that very question. I recently had a very mixed experience with code and how long I can run it.
Misleading concepts of risk
August 30, 2021
A common misconception maintains that different notions of risk capture the same concept: VaR, ES and volatility all measure the same "true" risk". In the same way as like Celsius, Fahrenheit and Kelvin all tell the same thing, only on a different scale. Not true.
The risk management ritual
July 12, 2021
Financial risk management has become ritualised. It is more important to follow the correct procedures than to control essential risks. Why and what does it mean for us?
I understand HOW. I do not understand WHY. Of engineers and cryptocurrencies
June 5, 2021
Do all the talented engineers working on cryptocurrencies ensure crypto success?
Misleading measurements and garbage in - garbage out models of systemic risk
May 23, 2021
There are many measurements of systemic risk and a huge number of papers depend on those measurements. But is that work of any use? There is an archetypical story from May 1944 where the staff of General Eisenhower called up the Army's meteorological office to ask for the weather forecast for Normandy on June 6. The meteorologists responded by saying, “Any weather forecast a month in the future is meaningless.” The response from the general's staff was: “Yes, we know that, but we need a number for planning purposes.”
Everybody working in the financial system has an incentive to increase its complexity, including the regulators
April 12, 2021
The almost infinite complexity of the financial system is the main reason why it is so hard to keep it under control. And that complexity is due to everybody that works in the financial system having incentives to increase its complexity, including the regulators.
What happens if bitcoin succeeds?
February 26, 2021
As the price of bitcoin continues to rise, this column argues that most of us would not want to live in a society where bitcoin succeeds. Fortunately, the internal contradictions and perverse consequences of cryptocurrencies success mean that they are destined for failure. Until then, it might make sense for speculators to ride the cryptocurrency bubble, so long as they get out in time.
Global market risk
February 14, 2021
There are a million ways to measure financial risk, and if one wants to calculate global risk, it requires a truly heroic set of assumptions. But it's much easier to calculate global market risk, and that is what I set myself to do below.
On the future of Amazon
February 13, 2021
As Amazon continues its exponential growth, where will it all end? Growth has to stop, but when and why?
How fast is the Apple M1?
February 3, 2021
The new Apple M1 processor has gotten excellent reviews for speed. Getting curious, I measured its speed on pure c code, latex and R and compared it to its most recent Intel competitors.
Moral hazard, the fear of the markets, and how central banks responded to Covid-19
January 28, 2021
Covid-19, Risk, Regulations
While the direct economic consequences of Covid-19 have been significant, the impact on the financial markets has been more nuanced. This column uses a unique data set on the financial markets’ fears and perceptions of long-run financial risk to identify how Covid-19, and particularly Fed policy responses to Covid-19, affected global market fears. While some Fed interventions had little or no impact on market fear, the most powerful were the US dollar swap lines, which strongly reduced the perceived likelihood of global market losses decades into the future. The results suggest that the Fed's relative global role has been strengthened, possibly at the cost of increased moral hazard.
Central bank digital currencies
January 13, 2021
Central-bank digital currencies will make the financial system more efficient. But will they make it safer? Maybe, but they could easily end up increasing systemic risk. Depends on the implementation.
Erasmus and Turing
January 11, 2021
As a part of its quest for independence, Britain decided to leave the Erasmus program. We now have Turing, the global version. So, will it lead us to the sunny uplands?
Brexit and Marxism
January 3, 2021
The Brexiteers and Karl Marx have more in common than often thought. Both were guided by ideology, and both refused to tell us how to get to the sunny uplands they promised.
What to do about the Covid financial system bailouts?
December 23, 2020
Financial crises and bailouts of financial institutions are inevitable and can't be prevented without paying too high a price. Diversity is the best way to minimise the frequency and severity of crises and ensure sustainable high economic growth.
The crypto-technical response to the Covid-19 bailouts
December 13, 2020
Are cryptocurrencies and blockchains the solution to the problem laid bare by the Covid-19 bailout of the financial system? No.
The libertarian response to the Covid-19 financial turmoil
December 9, 2020
A libertarian sees the Covid-19 bailout of the financial system as a predictable failure of regulations. Much better to have a laissez-faire economy and never, ever bail private firms out. But does the laissez-faire utopia survive contact with reality?
The socialist response to the Covid-19 financial turmoil
December 4, 2020
The state just saved the financial system from itself. What is the point of privately owned banks if they need to be bailed out every decade?
On the response of the financial authorities to Covid-19
December 2, 2020
The financial authorities have just bailed the financial system out for the second time in a decade. While the authorities are proud of having prevented a financial crisis, are we really better off? No, one cannot judge the policy intervention a success if it is only due to the promise of the intervention that the problem arose in the first place.
The Covid-19 bailouts and the future of the capitalist banking system
November 26, 2020
The central banks bailed out the financial system in March 2020, the second time they have done so in 12 years. What is the point of privately owned banks if they require a bailout every decade?
Which programming language is best for economic research: Julia, Matlab, Python or R?
August 20, 2020
The most widely used programming languages for economic research are Julia, Matlab, Python and R. This column uses three criteria to compare the languages: the power of available libraries, the speed and possibilities when handling large datasets, and the speed and ease-of-use for a computationally intensive task. While R is still a good choice, Julia is the language the authors now tend to pick for new projects and generally recommend.
ARM on AWS for R
June 15, 2020
Amazon AWS has been recommending ARM Graviton2 as a cost-effective alternative to Intel/AMD instances. So I tried it out.
Of Julia and R
May 3, 2020
I just tried the same code in R's data.tables and Julia's DataFrames, and the results are a bit surprising.
The five principles of correct riskometer use
April 27, 2020
It is easy to criticise risk forecasting, but it's rather pointless unless one can come up with proposals. Here are my five principles for the correct use of riskometers.
The problem with Backtesting
April 25, 2020
Backtesting is the magical technique that tells us how well a forecast model works. Test the model on history, and we have an objective way to evaluate how good the model is. But does it really work in practice?
Financial crises and epidemics
April 19, 2020
Epidemics and financial crises are different beasts. But they are eerily similar underneath — The dynamics, the politics, the mistakes and the learning all are the same.
Hayek et Corona
April 18, 2020
Corona est sans précédent et je suis enclin à permettre aux gouvernements une grande latitude. Des erreurs seront commises. Mais certaines sont pires que d'autres, et l'erreur économique la plus stupide que j'ai vue a été commise par la France cette semaine. Friedrich Hayek l’avait prévu en 1944.
Hayek and Corona
April 17, 2020
Corona is unprecedented and I am willing to give government's plenty of latitude. Mistakes will be made. But some are worse than others, and the dumbest economic mistake I have seen comes out of France this week. Friedrich Hayek saw it coming in 1944.
Ignoring the Corona analysis
April 15, 2020
We are bombarded by Corona epidemiology analysis. How it spreads, how to contain it, how to cure it, how it will play out. I am ignoring it all.
The coronavirus crisis is no 2008
March 26, 2020
Covid-19, Risk, Crises
Many comparisons have been made between the coronavirus crisis and the global systemic crisis in 2008. This column argues that seen through the lens of exogenous and endogenous risk, these two crises are quite different. Coronavirus is unlikely to cause a global systemic crisis, and the policy response should be different.
Artificial intelligence as a central banker
March 6, 2020
AI, Endogenous risk, Crises, Central banks
Artificial intelligence, such as the Bank of England Bot, is set to take over an increasing number of central bank functions. This column argues that the increased use of AI in central banking will bring significant cost and efficiency benefits, but also raise important concerns that are so far unresolved.
Systemic consequences of outsourcing to the cloud
December 2, 2019
Cyber, Systemic risk
Financial institutions are increasingly outsourcing information technology to the cloud, motivated by efficiency, security, and cost. This column argues that the consequence is likely to be short- and medium-term stability at the cost of the increased likelihood of catastrophic systemic events. Cloud providers are systemically important and should be regulated as such.
The dissonance of the short and long term
August 12, 2019
Risk, Policy, Endogenous risk
The type of risk we most care about is long-term, what happens over years or decades, but we tend to manage that risk over short periods. This column argues that the dissonance of risk is that we measure and manage what we don't care about and ignore what we do.
Central banks and reputation risk
August 6, 2019
As central banks accumulate ever more job functions, their reputation risk increases. This column offers a cautionary tale from Iceland where, after the central bank was put in charge of capital controls, it was subject to severe attacks because of perceived mistakes in how the capital controls were enforced. The accumulation of powers erodes a central bank’s independence and subjects it to regulatory paralysis.
The Brexit culture war
May 4, 2019
In all the disappointments about Brexit, one stands out for me — the inability of the libertarian Brexiteers to outline a coherent vision of what Brexit will accomplish. They used to see rational economic management as as a virtue, now what matters is culture.
All about BoB — The Bank of England Bot
April 29, 2019
Imagine the day when BoB — the Bank of England bot — comes to life, the artificial intelligence engine designed to keep us safe from the evils of the financial system.
The 2018 market in a 250 year context
December 31, 2018
The financial markets did not have a good 2018 as the media kept on reminding us:
Short and long-term risk
December 3, 2018
The riskiest year in human history was 1962. The year of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest we ever came to a nuclear war. The mother of all tail events, where all prices go to zero. Volatility that year was average — 16.5%
Cryptocurrencies: Financial stability and fairness
November 9, 2018
If private cryptocurrencies were to find widespread economic use the result would be increased financial instability, inequality, and social instability.
The hierarchy of financial policies
September 12, 2018
Policy, Central banks
On top is the authority in charge of fiscal policy, followed by those running monetary, microprudential, and finally macroprudential policies. This ranking can cause conflicts in terms of policy effectiveness and legitimacy.
Which numerical computing language is best: Julia, MATLAB, Python or R?
July 9, 2018
Julia, MATLAB, Python and R are among the most commonly used numerical programming languages by economic researchers. In this post, Jon Danielsson and Jia Rong Fan compare and contrast these four, reaching a very subjective conclusion as to which is best and which is worst.
June 26, 2018
Are cryptocurrencies the future of money, Ponzi schemes, speculators dream, freedom or just a cult?
Low risk as a predictor of financial crises
March 26, 2018
Risk, Crises, Endogenous risk
Reliable indicators of future financial crises are important for policymakers and practitioners. While most indicators consider an observation of high volatility as a warning signal, this column argues that such an alarm comes too late, arriving only once a crisis is already under way. A better warning is provided by low volatility, which is a reliable indication of an increased likelihood of a future crisis.
March 13, 2018
Do cryptocurrencies live up to the hype? Are they the future? Ponzi schemes or just a cult?
Cryptocurrencies don't make sense
February 13, 2018
Cryptocurrencies are supposedly a new and superior form of money and investments – the way of the future. The author of this column, however, does not see the point of cryptocurrencies, finding them no better than existing fiat money or good investments.
Yesterday's mini crash in a historical context
February 6, 2018
The stock market had a mini crash yesterday. So how big was that in a historical context?
Artificial intelligence and the stability of markets
November 15, 2017
AI, Endogenous risk
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used to tackle all sorts of problems facing people and societies. This column considers the potential benefits and risks of employing AI in financial markets. While it may well revolutionise risk management and financial supervision, it also threatens to destabilise markets and increase systemic risk.
Here be dragons
October 7, 2017
Medieval mapmakers noted the risk of an unknown kind by “here be dragons”. Attempts at measuring extreme risk should come with a similar warning. Just like the sailors of yesteryear, financial institutions will go into unknown territories and, just like the map makers of the earlier era, modern risk modellers have little to say.
VIX, CISS and all the political uncertainty
October 3, 2017
Two widely used indicators of financial risk, the VIX index and the ECB's CISS are at a historical low. The (financial) world must be really safe. However, that doesn't square with all the newspaper headlines screaming political uncertainty. What gives?
European bank-sovereign doom loop
September 30, 2017
European banks and sovereigns are much more closely linked than American banks and their government. The resulting bank-sovereign doom loop has been gathering strength, since the 2008 crisis.
Do the new financial regulations favour the largest banks?
September 27, 2017
The new postcrisis financial regulations, for example Basel III, have the unfortunate side effect of favouring the largest banks relative to the smaller. This can result in concentration, oligopolies, and even larger SIFI banks. This problem is made worse because of how Europe likes to regulate.
The ECB Systemic Risk Indicator
September 24, 2017
Systemic risk, Brexit
The European Central Bank has an indicator of systemic risk called, CISS. So what sort of signal does it send and what is it to be used for?
Finance is not engineering
September 22, 2017
Endogenous risk, Regulations
Regulations change behaviour and outcomes. It is seductively attractive to say that someone misbehaves, therefore we need the rule to prevent the misbehaviour. However, human beings, being human, don't just comply, their behaviour changes. That is why regulating the financial system is infinitely more complex than engineering.
University of Iceland seminar
June 14, 2017
I did a seminar at the University of Iceland. The first half of the presentation was about risk and regulations and the second part is about economic policy in Iceland.
Brexit and systemic risk
May 31, 2017
Brexit is likely to cause considerable disruption for financial markets. Some worry that it may also increase systemic risk. This column revisits the debate and argues that an increase in systemic risk is unlikely. While legal ‘plumbing’ and institutional and regulatory equivalence are of concern, systemic risk is more likely to fall due to increased financial fragmentation and caution by market participants in the face of uncertainty.
Should macroprudential policy target real estate prices?
May 12, 2017
Keynote speech at the bank of Lithuania on "Should macroprudential policy target real estate prices?"
With capital controls gone, Iceland must prioritise investing abroad
March 12, 2017
The Icelandic government announced today it it lifting its capital controls. Private investors, pension funds and the government need to prioritise investing abroad to lower the chance of another crash.
Is Julia ready for prime time?
March 11, 2017
I really want to like Julia. She promises to solve all the frustrations with other numerical languages.
Competing Brexit visions
February 25, 2017
I have been struggling to make sense of the Brexit debate. Perfectly reasonable, well informed and highly intelligent people reach diametrically opposite conclusions, all impeccably argued. In order to make sense of the debate, I did what any quant might do and made a graph of the competing Brexit visions.
Systemic consequences of Brexit
February 23, 2017
Systemic risk, Brexit
I got to present on the systemic risk consequences of Brexit in a SUERF conference.
Why macropru can end up being procyclical
December 15, 2016
Policy, Endogenous risk
Discretionary macroprudential policies aim to be countercyclical by adjusting risk-taking across the financial cycle. This column argues that the opposite effect may happen in certain cases. Depending on how regulators measure risk and how they react, the eventual outcome may well be procyclical, with serious unintended consequences.
The fatal flaw in macropru: It ignores political risk
December 8, 2016
Politics, Regulations, Central banks
Political risk is a major cause of systemic financial risk. This column argues that both the integrity and the legitimacy of macroprudential policy, or ‘macropru’, depends on political risk being included with other risk factors. Yet it is usually excluded from macropru, and that could be a fatal flaw.
Why it doesn't make sense to hold bonds
June 27, 2016
Investor demand for bonds is very high. This column argues that this is surprising because under almost any likely inflation scenario, including central banks merely hitting their target inflation rates, bondholders suffer large losses. The beneficiaries are sovereign and corporate borrowers; the losers are pension funds, insurance companies and some foreign exchange reserve funds. Meanwhile, the systemic risk from a bond crisis is increasing.
On the financial market consequences of Brexit
June 24, 2016
Brexit creates new opportunities and new risks for the British and EU financial markets. Both could benefit, but a more likely outcome is a fall in the quality of financial regulations, more inefficiency, more protectionism, and more systemic risk.
Cyber risk as systemic risk
June 10, 2016
Cyber, Systemic risk
The threat to the financial system posed by cyber risk is often claimed to be systemic. This column argues against this, pointing out that almost all cyber risk is microprudential. For a cyber attack to lead to a systemic crisis, it would need to be timed impeccably to coincide with other non-cyber events that undermine confidence in the financial system and the authorities. The only actors with enough resources to affect such an event are large sovereign states, and they could likely create the required uncertainty through simpler, financial means.
Big Banks' Risk Does Not Compute
May 24, 2016
A Bloomberg piece that cites our work, Big Banks' Risk Does Not Compute.
Will Brexit give us the 1950s or Hong Kong?
April 18, 2016
At the risk of overgeneralising, Brexiteers have two, rather different world views — 1950s Britain or the hip, modern, perhaps like Hong Kong. One certainly is more likely.
Of Brexit and regulations
April 16, 2016
One often hears from Brexit supporters that too many regulations come from Brussels, that it would be much better if we could regulate ourselves. At least when it comes to finance, that argument just does not hold water.
IMF and Iceland
April 12, 2016
I just spotted an interview with the IMF representatives to Iceland about their policy prescriptions, and it did make for an interesting reading.
Stability in Iceland
April 7, 2016
I got to address the annual meeting of Business Iceland today on the topic of "On fiscal and monetary policy in Iceland". The main theme was about what to do about the high economic volatility.
Everybody right, everybody wrong: Plural rationalities in macroprudential regulation
March 18, 2016
Macroprudential policy has become increasingly popular in the aftermath of the Global Crisis, but it remains controversial. This column argues that vigorous disagreement is both inevitable and healthy, reflecting differing fundamental views of how the financial system really works. By embracing the divergence of views instead of seeing it as problematic, macroprudential policymaking will be made easier and more effective. åÊ
Of tail risk
March 12, 2016
Suppose one cares about tail risk, what is the best way to estimate it? There are two, not mutually exclusive, ways; statistical and structural. Which is right?
Models and regulations and the political leadership
February 27, 2016
Risk, Models, Policy
Why do the regulatory authorities seemingly fall into the category of model believers, if not quite to the view that there must be one true model? Well, it is sort of inevitable the way the regulatory process works.
Why do we rely so much on models when we know they can't be trusted?
February 26, 2016
There a lot of evidence that models are less than perfectly reliable. Why then do we rely so much on models in decision-making, and especially financial regulations? Because there are three types of people: Believers in true model, skeptics who accept model risk and nihilistic rejectionists.
Does a true model exist and does it matter?
February 25, 2016
When designing models, the underlying assumption is often that the model captures the true data generating process. Does a true model exist? To me, the question is completely irrelevant.
The point of central banks
January 25, 2016
Much of the analysis of the recent market turmoil is amusing.
The macro-micro conflict
October 20, 2015
Policy, Central banks
There has always been conflict between macro- and microeconomic regulation. Microeconomic policy reigns supreme during good times, and macro during bad. This column explains that while the macro and micro objectives have always been present in regulatory design, their relative importance has varied according to the changing requirements of economic, financial and political cycles. The conflict between the two seems set to deepen and so, regardless of which wins, policymakers must not undermine the central bank's execution of monetary policy.
Impact of the recent market turmoil on risk measures
August 28, 2015
Last January I looked at how the Swiss FX shock affected the most popular risk measures. Events of the past week give us another interesting test. My daily risk forecast shows the various risk measures for a number of assets, but focus on the SP-500, and the following picture taken from the site today: Last January I looked at how the Swiss FX shock affected the most popular risk measures. Events of the past week give us another interesting test. My daily risk forecast shows the various risk measures for a number of assets, but focus on the SP-500, and the following picture taken from the site today:
Iceland, Greece and political hectoring
August 13, 2015
The Greek and the Icelandic crisis have much in common, not the least the heavy pressure from foreign countries and the hectoring from their public officials. In Iceland and in Greece this was counterproductive, hardening the opposition to any settlement. The will to reform needs to come from within, and the sooner the Troika realizes this, the easier it will be to deal with the Greek situation.
A proposed research and policy agenda for systemic risk
August 7, 2015
The long-running Greek crisis and China's recent stock market crash are the latest threats to the stability of the global financial system. But as this column explains, systemic risk is an inevitable part of any market-based economy. While we won't eliminate systemic risk entirely, the agenda for researchers and policymakers should be to create a more resilient financial system that is less prone to disastrous crises and that still delivers benefits for the economy and for society.
Are asset managers systemically important?
August 5, 2015
Systemic risk, Regulations, Policy
Some financial authorities have proposed designating asset managers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This column argues that this would be premature and probably ill conceived. The motivation for such a step comes from an inappropriate application of macroprudential thought from banking, rather than the underlying externalities that might cause asset managers to contribute to systemic risk. Further, policy authorities are silent on the question of what SIFI designation should mean in practice, despite the inherent link between identification and remedy.
Risky business: Finding the balance between financial stability and risk
July 24, 2015
Systemic risk, Policy
It is important that we understand and do something about systemic risk. The problem is that we desire two incompatible things simultaneously: we wish the financial system to be safe; but we also want to finance risky economic activity.
Objective function of macro-prudential regulations
July 24, 2015
Risk, Systemic risk, Regulations
I have been in a conference for the past few days, and have seen a few presentations on macropru type regulations.
Regulators could be responsible for next financial crash
July 21, 2015
Risk, Systemic risk, Regulations
LSE report warns that forcing financial institutions to forecast risk in the same way could mean they will all end up being caught unawares.
Greece on Sprengisandur
July 12, 2015
I got to talk about Greece on the radio show Sprengisandur, if you understand Icelandic.
Why Iceland can now remove capital controls
June 11, 2015
Iceland has just announced it is getting rid of its capital controls. This column argues that the government's plan is a credible, efficient and fair plan to lift the costly and misguided controls.
Market moves that are supposed to happen every half-decade keep happening
May 14, 2015
Bloomberg today had an interesting piece, called Market Moves That Are Supposed to Happen Every Half-Decade Keep Happening. Here is their self-described "terribly simplistic list"
May 12, 2015
I got to participate in a discussion on capital controls, sponsored by Samtök Atvinnulífsins which could be translated as the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce. The event was held in the lovely Harpa.
Why risk is hard to measure
April 25, 2015
Risk, Endogenous risk
Regulators and financial institutions increasingly depend on statistical risk forecasting. This column argues that most risk modelling approaches are highly inaccurate and confidence intervals should be provided along with point estimates. Two major approaches, value-at-risk and expected shortfall are compared, and while the former is found to be superior in practice, it is also easier to be manipulated by forecasters.åÊ
The Danish FX event
March 9, 2015
Denmark had a small FX event on March 20, in the context of the Swiss FX shock, it is not much a of an event, but it does reinforce stereotypes.
Post-Crisis banking regulation: Evolution of economic thinking as it happened on Vox
March 2, 2015
This column introduces a new Vox eBook collecting some of the best Vox columns on financial regulations, starting with the fundamentals of financial regulations, moving on to bank capital and the Basel regulations, and finishing with the wider considerations of the regulatory agenda and the political dimension. Collecting columns from over the past six years, this eBook maps the evolution of leading thought on banking regulation.
Europe's proposed capital markets union
February 23, 2015
The proposed EU capital markets union aims to revitalise Europe's economy by creating efficient funding channels between providers of loanable funds and firms best placed to use them. This column argues that a successful union would deliver investment, innovation, and growth, but it depends on overcoming difficult regulatory challenges. A successful union would also change the nature of systemic risk in Europe.
What do ES and VaR say about the tails
February 9, 2015
So, does ES capture tail risk, but VaR not? Therefore the Basel committee is correct, and we all should use ES. Is that true?
What the Swiss FX shock says about risk models
January 18, 2015
The Swiss central bank last week abandoned its euro exchange rate ceiling. This column argues that the fallout from the decision demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of the regulator-approved standard risk models used in financial institutions. These models under-forecast risk before the announcement and over-forecast risk after the announcement, getting it wrong in all states of the world.
On the Swiss FX shock
January 9, 2015
Risk, Models, Policy
Just looked again at the what I did on the January 2015 Swiss FX shock, looking at how the various risk measures performed in the days after the event, and also looking at the risk of the inverse FX.
Model risk: Risk measures when models may be wrong
June 8, 2014
Risk forecasting is central to financial regulations, risk management, and macroprudential policy. This column raises concerns about the reliance on risk forecasting, since risk forecast models have high levels of model risk - especially when the models are needed the most, during crises. Policymakers should be wary of relying solely on such models. Formal model-risk analysis should be a part of the regulatory design process.
The new market-risk regulations
November 28, 2013
Basel III is coming into focus. The fundamental logic of the regulatory changes seems sensible, but the devil is in the detail - empirical implementation. This column discusses a detailed quantitative study, incorporating analytical calculations, Monte Carlo simulations and results from observed data. It concludes that the Basel Committee has taken three and a half steps backwards and half a step forward. If implemented, the framework is likely to lead to less robust risk forecasts than current methodologies.
Solvency II: Three principles to respect
October 21, 2013
Europe is set to finally approve new insurance regulation, Solvency II. This column argues that the final text should respect three fundamental principles to ensure solvency.
Political challenges of the macroprudential agenda
September 6, 2013
Policy, Central banks, Politics
Central banks frequently lead the macroprudential policy implementation. The hope is that their credibility in conquering inflation might rub off on macroprudential policy. This column argues the opposite. The fuzziness of the macroprudential agenda and the interplay of political pressures may undermine monetary policy.
Iceland's post-Crisis economy: A myth or a miracle?
May 21, 2013
Icelandic voters recently ejected its post-Crisis government - a government that successfully avoided economic collapse when the odds were stacked against it. The new government comprises the same parties that were originally responsible for the Crisis. What's going on? This column argues that this switch is, in fact, logical given the outgoing government's mishandling of the economy and their deference towards foreign creditors.
The capital controls in Cyprus and the Icelandic experience
March 28, 2013
Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls. This column sheds light on how temporary and how damaging they are likely to be, based on Iceland's experience. The longer controls exist, the harder they are to abolish. Icelandic capital controls, which have been Û÷temporary' for half a decade, deeply damage the economy by discouraging investment. We can only hope the authorities that created the chaos in the first place realise that temporary really needs to mean temporary.
Towards a more procyclical financial system
March 6, 2013
Regulations, Policy, Endogenous risk
Is the fact that different banks have different risk models problematic? Contrary to the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority, this column argues that heterogeneity is a good thing. It leads to countercyclicality, and thereby reduces instances of procyclical price movements. Both the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority have indicated that they are troubled by heterogeneity and are seeking to rectify the problem. Their conclusion is plainly wrong.
Europe's pre-Eurozone debt crisis: Faroe Islands in the 1990s
September 11, 2012
The current EZ crisis is not Europe's first sovereign-debt crisis. This column shows parallels can be drawn from an all-but-forgotten episode, i.e. the 1990 Faroese crisis. Just like Greece, the Faroes got into difficulty because of excess borrowing facilitated by a currency union with an AAA-rated partner undeterred as the sovereign debt spiralled upwards. In the Faroese case, the crisis was eventually resolved when political necessities outweighed the cost of the bailout.
Countercyclical regulation in Solvency II: Merits and flaws
June 23, 2012
October 2011 saw the latest draft of Solvency II, the European Union's code for regulation of the insurance industry. This column argues that the latest proposals need to be drafted again, urgently.
The Greek crisis: When political desire triumphs economic reality
March 2, 2012
October 2011 saw the latest draft of Solvency II, the European Union's code for regulation of the insurance industry. This column argues that the latest proposals need to be drafted again, urgently.
Iceland and the IMF: Why the capital controls are entirely wrong
November 14, 2011
The IMF has emerged from the global crisis bigger and more powerful. But this column argues that the capital controls it required Iceland to adopt in 2008 are not of the soft and cuddly modern type that slow hot money flows. Instead they are akin to the draconian controls common in the 1950s. They violate the civil rights of Icelanders and significantly hamper economic growth.
Iceland: Was the IMF programme successful?
October 27, 2011
According to the IMF, Iceland has graduated from its Fund-supported programme with unqualified success. This column begs to differ.
How not to resolve a banking crisis: Learning from Iceland's mistakes
October 26, 2011
Much of macroeconomic policymaking is trial and error. This column discusses calamitous error on the part of Iceland's policymakers, in the hope that others can at least try something else.
Capital, politics and bank weaknesses
June 27, 2011
A debate is raging on capital adequacy requirements for banks. The UK wants to be allowed to be on ÛÏtop upÛ the agreed levels, i.e. to impose stricter capital standards than the EU minimum. This column argues the UK is right, and that the German and French opposition might be motivated by weaknesses in their banking systems.
The appropriate use of risk models: Part II
June 17, 2011
Financial risk models have been widely criticised for both theoretical and practical failures, especially during the recent financial crisis. In the second of two columns, the authors outline why the shortcomings of risk models matter before making suggestions for how the financial industry and supervisors should use models in practice.
The appropriate use of risk models: Part I
June 16, 2011
Risk models are at the heart of the financial sector's self-monitoring as well as supervision by regulators. This column, the first of two, addresses the question of how risk models are misused in practice by practitioners and supervisors alike. This misuse causes risk management to fail when it is most needed.
Lessons from the Icesave rejection
April 27, 2011
Icelanders have voted against providing a government guarantee for claims made by the UK and the Dutch governments against Iceland's deposit insurance fund. This column argues that the heated debates surrounding the referendum may provide a glimpse into the challenges that lie ahead for European policymakers as they attempt to allocate losses suffered by banks between the taxpayers of different countries.
A prudential regulatory issue at the heart of Solvency II
March 31, 2011
Systemic risk, Policy
A delicate regulatory question is under consideration on the capital (reserve) requirements at the heart of Solvency II (the insurance industry equivalent of Basel III), which is scheduled to come into effect by 2013. This decision will have implications for both regulation of insurers and for macroprudential stability. The six authors of this article were invited to discuss the issues and concluded that more public scrutiny over this important question is urgently needed.
Valuing insurers' liabilities during crises: What EU policymakers should not do
March 18, 2011
Systemic risk, Policy
In crises, insurance companies' asset values may fall significantly without a corresponding drop in their liabilities. European insurers have argued that their liabilities should be discounted by a higher rate during crises, lest regulations force them to raise more capital at exactly the wrong time. This column argues that that would be the wrong approach to the problem.
Risk and crises: How the models failed and are failing
February 18, 2011
Financial models are widely blamed for underestimating and thus mispricing risk prior to the crisis. This column analyses how the models failed and questions their prominent use in the post-crisis reform process. It argues that over-relying on market data and statistical forecasting models has the potential to further destabilise the financial system and increase systemic risk.
The saga of Icesave: A new CEPR Policy Insight
January 26, 2010
Icelanders may well reject the terms of the financial deal with Britain and the Dutch in a March referendum. This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight arguing that responsibility for Icesave losses falls jointly on Iceland, Britain and the Netherlands. Regardless of the vote, the three governments should come to a more reasonable agreement that enables Iceland to pay its obligations without tipping the economy into the abyss.
Iceland applies for EU membership, the outcome is uncertain
July 21, 2009
The Icelandic parliament has decided to apply for EU membership. This column warns that domestic opposition and outstanding disputes with EU member countries on Icesave may derail the agreement.
May 25, 2009
Bank bonuses have been blamed for contributing to the crisis, and regulators and politicians are now demanding changes in compensation arrangements. Most of these calls are based on a misconception of the nature of financial risk, an inflated view of the efficacy of risk models, and an incorrect view of the incentive issues facing financial institutions. This column proposes reforms that would discipline senior managers by exposing them to the dangers of junior managers' risk taking.
Not so fast! There's no reason to regulate everything
March 25, 2009
Many are calling for significant new financial regulations. This column says that if the regulate everything that moves crowd has its way, we will repeat past mistakes and impose significant costs on the economy, to little or no benefit. The next crisis is years away, we have time to do bank regulation right.
Modelling financial turmoil through endogenous risk
March 11, 2009
By incorporating endogenous risk into a standard asset-pricing model, this column shows how banks' capacity to bear risk seemingly evaporates in the face of market turmoil, pushing the financial system further into a tailspin. It suggests that risk-sensitive prudential regulation, in the spirit of Basel II, makes systemic financial crises sharper, larger, and more costly.
Financial regulation built on sand: The myth of the riskometer
March 1, 2009
Models, Endogenous risk, Regulations
Much of today's financial regulation assumes that risk can be accurately measured so that financial engineers, like civil engineers, can design safe products with sophisticated maths informed by historical estimates. But, as the crisis has shown, the laws of finance react to financial engineers' creations, rendering risk calculations invalid. Regulators should rely on simpler methods.
Government failures in Iceland: Entranced by banking
February 9, 2009
Some view Iceland's crisis as holding lessons for any country with an outsized financial sector, e.g. the UK. This column disagrees, arguing that Iceland's downfall is explained by the way its unique history, inappropriate policy responses, and weaknesses in EU banking regulations created a perfect storm, unlikely to happen elsewhere.
How bad could the crisis get? Lessons from Iceland
November 12, 2008
Iceland's banking system is ruined. GDP is down 65% in euro terms. Many companies face bankruptcy; others think of moving abroad. A third of the population is considering emigration. The British and Dutch governments demand compensation, amounting to over 100% of Icelandic GDP, for their citizens who held high-interest deposits in local branches of Icelandic banks. Europe's leaders urgently need to take step to prevent similar things from happening to small nations with big banking sectors.
Regulation and financial models: Complexity kills
September 29, 2008
Complex financial models and intricate assets structures meant extraordinary profits before the crisis. Markets for structured products became overly inflated as even the banks did not have a clear view of the state of their investments. Given complexity's role in today's mess, future regulation should focus on variables that are easy to measure and hard to manipulate (e.g. leverage ratios).
Blame the models
May 8, 2008
In response to financial turmoil, supervisors are demanding more risk calculations. But model-driven mispricing produced the crisis, and risk models don't perform during crisis conditions. The belief that a really complicated statistical model must be right is merely foolish sophistication.
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