Endogenous risk
17 posts in this category
The dark side of well meaning rules and endogenous risk
10 January 2026
The dark side of well meaning financial regulations is when they force banks to act against the system, like pouring petrol on a fire.
The paradox of perfect supervision
23 December 2025 · VoxEU.org
Increasingly stringent financial supervision paradoxically increases systemic fragility. The very attempt to safeguard stability can increase systemic risk by increasing complexity and synchronising behaviour. Rather than pursuing ever-tighter risk control, the authorities should focus on resilience through institutional diversification.
Endogenous Risk
13 December 2025
A data-driven risk management process can not capture endogenous risk, only exogenous risk.
Perceived and actual risk
12 November 2022
Perceived risk is risk predicted by models, and actual risk is the fundamental underlying risk. We measure perceived risk and care about the actual risk. Those two are negatively correlated with interesting consequences.
The illusion of control
7 November 2022 · VoxEU.org
Global macroprudential and microprudential regulatory changes since 2008 have been designed to make a repeat of a systemic crisis much less likely. This column argues that one-size-fits-all regulation constrains market response to short-term fluctuations in measured risk. Without more diversity in regulation, this will increase the likelihood of systemic crises in future.
How global risk perceptions affect economic growth
13 January 2022 · VoxEU.org
The relationship between financial risk and economic growth is complex. This column finds that perceptions of high risk unambiguously harm growth, while perceived low risk has an initial positive impact, which eventually turns negative. Global risk has a stronger effect on growth than local risk, via its impact on capital flows, investment, and debt-issuer quality, challenging monetary policy independence.
Artificial intelligence as a central banker
6 March 2020 · VoxEU.org
Artificial intelligence, such as the Bank of England Bot, is set to take over an increasing number of central bank functions. This column argues that the increased use of AI in central banking will bring significant cost and efficiency benefits, but also raise important concerns that are so far unresolved.
The dissonance of the short and long term
12 August 2019 · VoxEU.org
The type of risk we most care about is long-term, what happens over years or decades, but we tend to manage that risk over short periods. This column argues that the dissonance of risk is that we measure and manage what we don't care about and ignore what we do.
Low risk as a predictor of financial crises
26 March 2018 · VoxEU.org
Reliable indicators of future financial crises are important for policymakers and practitioners. While most indicators consider an observation of high volatility as a warning signal, this column argues that such an alarm comes too late, arriving only once a crisis is already under way. A better warning is provided by low volatility, which is a reliable indication of an increased likelihood of a future crisis.
Artificial intelligence and the stability of markets
15 November 2017 · VoxEU.org
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used to tackle all sorts of problems facing people and societies. This column considers the potential benefits and risks of employing AI in financial markets. While it may well revolutionise risk management and financial supervision, it also threatens to destabilise markets and increase systemic risk.
Finance is not engineering
22 September 2017
Regulations change behaviour and outcomes. It is seductively attractive to say that someone misbehaves, therefore we need the rule to prevent the misbehaviour. However, human beings, being human, don't just comply, their behaviour changes. That is why regulating the financial system is infinitely more complex than engineering.
Why macropru can end up being procyclical
15 December 2016 · VoxEU.org
Discretionary macroprudential policies aim to be countercyclical by adjusting risk-taking across the financial cycle. This column argues that the opposite effect may happen in certain cases. Depending on how regulators measure risk and how they react, the eventual outcome may well be procyclical, with serious unintended consequences.
Volatility, financial crises and Minsky's hypothesis
2 October 2015 · VoxEU.org
Why risk is hard to measure
25 April 2015 · VoxEU.org
Regulators and financial institutions increasingly depend on statistical risk forecasting. This column argues that most risk modelling approaches are highly inaccurate and confidence intervals should be provided along with point estimates. Two major approaches, value-at-risk and expected shortfall are compared, and while the former is found to be superior in practice, it is also easier to be manipulated by forecasters.åÊ
Towards a more procyclical financial system
6 March 2013 · VoxEU.org
Is the fact that different banks have different risk models problematic? Contrary to the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority, this column argues that heterogeneity is a good thing. It leads to countercyclicality, and thereby reduces instances of procyclical price movements. Both the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority have indicated that they are troubled by heterogeneity and are seeking to rectify the problem. Their conclusion is plainly wrong.
Modelling financial turmoil through endogenous risk
11 March 2009 · VoxEU.org
By incorporating endogenous risk into a standard asset-pricing model, this column shows how banks' capacity to bear risk seemingly evaporates in the face of market turmoil, pushing the financial system further into a tailspin. It suggests that risk-sensitive prudential regulation, in the spirit of Basel II, makes systemic financial crises sharper, larger, and more costly.
Financial regulation built on sand: The myth of the riskometer
1 March 2009 · VoxEU.org
Much of today's financial regulation assumes that risk can be accurately measured so that financial engineers, like civil engineers, can design safe products with sophisticated maths informed by historical estimates. But, as the crisis has shown, the laws of finance react to financial engineers' creations, rendering risk calculations invalid. Regulators should rely on simpler methods.