Central banks
6 posts in this category
Artificial intelligence as a central banker
6 March 2020 · VoxEU.org
Artificial intelligence, such as the Bank of England Bot, is set to take over an increasing number of central bank functions. This column argues that the increased use of AI in central banking will bring significant cost and efficiency benefits, but also raise important concerns that are so far unresolved.
Central banks and reputation risk
6 August 2019 · VoxEU.org
As central banks accumulate ever more job functions, their reputation risk increases. This column offers a cautionary tale from Iceland where, after the central bank was put in charge of capital controls, it was subject to severe attacks because of perceived mistakes in how the capital controls were enforced. The accumulation of powers erodes a central bank’s independence and subjects it to regulatory paralysis.
The hierarchy of financial policies
12 September 2018 · VoxEU.org
On top is the authority in charge of fiscal policy, followed by those running monetary, microprudential, and finally macroprudential policies. This ranking can cause conflicts in terms of policy effectiveness and legitimacy.
The fatal flaw in macropru: It ignores political risk
8 December 2016 · VoxEU.org
Political risk is a major cause of systemic financial risk. This column argues that both the integrity and the legitimacy of macroprudential policy, or ‘macropru’, depends on political risk being included with other risk factors. Yet it is usually excluded from macropru, and that could be a fatal flaw.
The macro-micro conflict
20 October 2015 · VoxEU.org
There has always been conflict between macro- and microeconomic regulation. Microeconomic policy reigns supreme during good times, and macro during bad. This column explains that while the macro and micro objectives have always been present in regulatory design, their relative importance has varied according to the changing requirements of economic, financial and political cycles. The conflict between the two seems set to deepen and so, regardless of which wins, policymakers must not undermine the central bank's execution of monetary policy.
Political challenges of the macroprudential agenda
6 September 2013 · VoxEU.org
Central banks frequently lead the macroprudential policy implementation. The hope is that their credibility in conquering inflation might rub off on macroprudential policy. This column argues the opposite. The fuzziness of the macroprudential agenda and the interplay of political pressures may undermine monetary policy.