Systemic risk
40 posts in this category
Stablecoins: crises, geopolitics and policy
15 October 2026 · Forum on Financial Supervision
Stablecoins are run-optimised money. The features that make them cheap, fast and available around the clock also let shocks turn into near-instant global runs. The fragilities are the ones Bagehot identified in 1873, but the speed, the cross-border reach and the loss of public circuit breakers are new. The benefits go mainly to the United States and the risks fall on weak-currency countries. Banning stablecoins is generally the wrong response. With Robert Macrae.
AI and financial stability
27 September 2026
AI is making cyber attacks on the financial system easier. The damage may depend more on the state of the system when an attack occurs — the double coincidence. Geopolitics can undermine the multilateral response. AI also changes who wins and loses in banking, widens the gap between banks and supervisors and can shorten crises from days or weeks to minutes or hours.
The debt snowball in numbers
19 September 2026
For most governments the debt snowball still helps. In the US, the UK, France and Germany, the debt is growing because of the deficits. But what happens when the debt is refinanced at today's interest rates?
Risk appetite, growth and crises
18 September 2026
Which is a better indicator for future growth and instability, low risk or high risk? While Most discussion focus on high risk, Low risk is more informative. It drives economic growth for a few years until the investments made in the quiet years turn out badly, growth reverses and a crisis becomes more likely. It can hence be used to forecast both crises and growth. By contrast, high risk mostly tells us about the year ahead. High risk is correlated While low risk is predictive.
The next crisis
17 September 2026
So where will the next crisis come from? AI? Interest rates? Government debt? War? Something else? While much analysis focuses on one of these at a time, the real danger lies in what they have in common and how they interact with, and even amplify, each other.
What the AI cyber risk debate misses
25 July 2026
AI-enabled cyber attacks on the financial system are getting a lot of attention. But one ingredient is missing from the discussion, the double coincidence. Without it, policy risks false confidence and the wrong crisis preparations.
What role will AI play in the next crisis? Is it the one the authorities expect?
11 July 2026
Artificial intelligence speeds up and intensifies financial crises and makes them harder to resolve. We need AI to meet the stability challenges posed by AI, only to find it is least reliable when needed the most. That problem is compounded because the authorities are likely to rely on the same models as the private sector while facing tighter restrictions on how they can use them. That combination endogenously makes it more likely that a containable shock becomes a systemic crisis.
Deregulation and financial stability
4 July 2026
Calls to simplify financial regulation are met with warnings that doing so would destabilise the financial system. Correct?
Why extreme risk cannot be measured
26 June 2026
Can we measure extreme financial risk? Is financial stability only a question of technology and data? Many seem to think so. I disagree.
Stablecoins are run-optimised instruments
2 April 2026 · SUERF
Stablecoins are private digital money designed to trade at par with a fiat currency. The promise of cheap and fast trading around the clock and across borders makes them run-optimised — faster, synchronised exits will compress stablecoin crises to minutes or hours. AI will exacerbate this.
Financial stability and politics
28 February 2026
Politics might be the single largest driver of financial crises, but impossible for the financial authorities to address — the fatal flaw in macroprudential policy.
Same risk, same regulation — a principle that sounds better than it is
21 February 2026
"Same risk, same regulation" is one of those rare principles in finance that almost everybody seems to endorse. But is it as sensible as it sounds?
How financial authorities best respond to AI challenges
25 November 2025 · VoxEU.org
Artificial intelligence is transforming finance faster than the authorities can adapt. This column argues that while AI enhances the financial system’s efficiency, it also poses new, poorly understood risks. To stay relevant, the supervisory authorities must develop their own AI capabilities, use federated learning for cross-jurisdiction models, and design intervention facilities that can respond at machine speed. If they cannot keep pace, the consequences will be ineffective supervision and a higher risk of financial crisis.
Of AI bubbles and crashes
16 October 2025 · VoxEU.org
Warnings of an AI stock market bubble abound. Should investors and policymakers be concerned? Innovation-driven bubbles can yield real benefits when financed by equity rather than debt. Even if investors face large losses, policymakers have little reason for concern, unless it drives risk appetite elsewhere in the system and AI investment relies on bank credit.
Supervision and the Illusion of Optimal Risk
11 October 2025
Should supervision be about finding the optimal level of risk? It sometimes seems that way. A sensible idea in portfolio management, less so when applied to supervision.
The Paradox of Perfect Supervision
5 October 2025
The common, perhaps even prevailing, culture among supervisors is to see undesirable outcomes as the result of insufficient resources, information and power. If only they knew all the positions and the associated risks, and were able to ensure the private sector had the right processes in place to control that risk, all would be well — Perfect supervision.
How central banks can meet the financial stability challenges arising from artificial intelligence
15 May 2025 · SUERF
The growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) poses difficult challenges for the financial authorities. AI allows private-sector firms to optimise against existing regulatory frameworks, helps those who want to damage the financial system, amplifies wrong-way risk and speeds up financial crises. It also gives the authorities new tools for executing their mandate. The authorities could become more effective stewards of the financial system by gaining expertise in AI, setting up AI-to-AI links, developing triggered facilities and incorporating AI into their monitoring frameworks.
Five systemic threats and what to do about them
2 April 2025 · SUERF
Systemic financial risk has both internal and external drivers. So, when we focus too strongly on preventing internal crises, such as the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, we tend to miss out on the more important external risks. Five external risk factors stand out: populism, debt-driven death spirals, manufactured tensions, artificial intelligence and geopolitics. To combat these threats, the macroprudential authorities should reorient away from derisking the financial system and towards resilience and economic growth via deregulation and diversification.
Climate risk does not affect systemic financial risk
22 February 2025
Climate risk is not a systemic financial risk. Folding it into financial regulations will likely backfire, not mitigate climate damage and even increase systemic risk.
Artificial intelligence and stability
6 February 2025 · VoxEU.org
Financial institutions are rapidly embracing AI – but at what cost to financial stability? This column argues that AI introduces novel stability risks that the financial authorities may be unprepared for, raising the spectre of faster, more vicious financial crises. The authorities need to (1) establish internal AI expertise and AI systems, (2) make AI a core function of the financial stability divisions, (3) acquire AI systems that can interface directly with the AI engines of financial institutions, (4) set up automatically triggered liquidity facilities, and (5) outsource critical AI functions to third-party vendors.
How the financial authorities can respond to AI threats to financial stability
28 July 2024 · VoxEU.org
Artificial intelligence can act to either stabilise the financial system or to increase the frequency and severity of financial crises. This second column in a two-part series argues that the way things turn out may depend on how the financial authorities choose to engage with AI. The authorities are at a considerable disadvantage because private-sector financial institutions have access to expertise
AI financial crises
26 July 2024 · VoxEU.org
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence is transforming the financial industry. This first of a two-column series argues that AI may either increase systemic financial risk or act to stabilise the system, depending on endogenous responses, strategic complementarities, the severity of events it faces, and the objectives it is given. Stress that might have taken days or weeks to unfold can now happen in minutes or hours. AI's ability to master complexity and respond rapidly to shocks means future crises will likely be more intense than those we have seen so far.
How AI can undermine financial stability
22 January 2024 · VoxEU.org
As artificial intelligence makes inroads into the financial system, it exacerbates existing channels of instability and creates new ones. This column identifies several such channels, malicious and misinformed use, misalignment and the evasion of control, and finally risk monoculture and oligopolies. All arise when AI vulnerabilities interact with economic fragilities like strategic complementarities, problems of incentives, and incomplete contracts.
Artificial intelligence and financial stability
27 October 2023 · VoxEU.org
The use of artificial intelligence in the private sector is accelerating, and the financial authorities have no choice but to follow if they are to remain effective. Even when preferring prudence, their use of AI will probably grow by stealth. This column argues that although AI will bring considerable benefits, it also raises new challenges and can even destabilise the financial system.
Systemic risk in 2008 and today
1 October 2022
The perceived wisdom maintains that systemic risk was much higher in 2008 than it is today. I am not so sure.
Review of "Nuclear folly, a new history of the Cuban missile crisis" and lessons for financial policy
12 August 2022
I just read "Nuclear folly, a new history of the Cuban missile crisis" by Serhii Plokhy. It’s an excellent book, not only telling the story from the Soviet side for the first time but also with many lessons for those interested in central banks and financial stability.
Crypto and financial stability
14 July 2022
A lot of turmoil in crypto. Does that mean crypto markets should be regulated? The turmoil is driven by violent price volatility, exposing weaknesses in technology and business models. Any financial stability impact arises from that. Fundamental to crypto volatility is the nature of demand and supply. A lot of investors sell, so the price drops. Why do they sell?
Who is to blame for the rising systemic risk?
6 July 2022
I ran a poll on LinkedIn and Twitter, asking who is to blame for the rising systemic risk. The overwhelming majority on both agreed. The options were: Covid, Putin, the central banks and it’s just bad luck. The LinkedIn poll attracted 106 votes and the Twitter one 23.
Systemic consequences of outsourcing to the cloud
2 December 2019 · VoxEU.org
Financial institutions are increasingly outsourcing information technology to the cloud, motivated by efficiency, security, and cost. This column argues that the consequence is likely to be short- and medium-term stability at the cost of the increased likelihood of catastrophic systemic events. Cloud providers are systemically important and should be regulated as such.
The ECB Systemic Risk Indicator
24 September 2017
The European Central Bank has an indicator of systemic risk called, CISS. So what sort of signal does it send and what is it to be used for?
Systemic consequences of Brexit
23 February 2017
I got to present on the systemic risk consequences of Brexit in a SUERF conference. The slides can be downloaded here. The main conclusions are:
Cyber risk as systemic risk
10 June 2016 · VoxEU.org
The threat to the financial system posed by cyber risk is often claimed to be systemic. This column argues against this, pointing out that almost all cyber risk is microprudential. For a cyber attack to lead to a systemic crisis, it would need to be timed impeccably to coincide with other non-cyber events that undermine confidence in the financial system and the authorities. The only actors with enough resources to affect such an event are large sovereign states, and they could likely create the required uncertainty through simpler, financial means.
A proposed research and policy agenda for systemic risk
7 August 2015 · VoxEU.org
The long-running Greek crisis and China's recent stock market crash are the latest threats to the stability of the global financial system. But as this column explains, systemic risk is an inevitable part of any market-based economy. While we won't eliminate systemic risk entirely, the agenda for researchers and policymakers should be to create a more resilient financial system that is less prone to disastrous crises and that still delivers benefits for the economy and for society.
Are asset managers systemically important?
5 August 2015 · VoxEU.org
Some financial authorities have proposed designating asset managers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This column argues that this would be premature and probably ill conceived. The motivation for such a step comes from an inappropriate application of macroprudential thought from banking, rather than the underlying externalities that might cause asset managers to contribute to systemic risk. Further, policy authorities are silent on the question of what SIFI designation should mean in practice, despite the inherent link between identification and remedy.
Risky business: Finding the balance between financial stability and risk
24 July 2015
It is important that we understand and do something about systemic risk. The problem is that we desire two incompatible things simultaneously: we wish the financial system to be safe; but we also want to finance risky economic activity.
Objective function of macro-prudential regulations
24 July 2015
I have been in a conference for the past few days, and have seen a few presentations on macropru type regulations.
Regulators could be responsible for next financial crash
21 July 2015
LSE report warns that forcing financial institutions to forecast risk in the same way could mean they will all end up being caught unawares.
A prudential regulatory issue at the heart of Solvency II
31 March 2011 · VoxEU.org
A delicate regulatory question is under consideration on the capital (reserve) requirements at the heart of Solvency II (the insurance industry equivalent of Basel III), which is scheduled to come into effect by 2013. This decision will have implications for both regulation of insurers and for macroprudential stability. The six authors of this article were invited to discuss the issues and concluded that more public scrutiny over this important question is urgently needed.
Valuing insurers' liabilities during crises: What EU policymakers should not do
18 March 2011 · VoxEU.org
In crises, insurance companies' asset values may fall significantly without a corresponding drop in their liabilities. European insurers have argued that their liabilities should be discounted by a higher rate during crises, lest regulations force them to raise more capital at exactly the wrong time. This column argues that that would be the wrong approach to the problem.