Risk
69 posts in this category
Risk appetite, growth and crises
18 September 2026
Which is a better indicator for future growth and instability, low risk or high risk? While Most discussion focus on high risk, Low risk is more informative. It drives economic growth for a few years until the investments made in the quiet years turn out badly, growth reverses and a crisis becomes more likely. It can hence be used to forecast both crises and growth. By contrast, high risk mostly tells us about the year ahead. High risk is correlated While low risk is predictive.
How data lies
22 July 2026
Does data lie to us when it captures the measurable but not the real? Yes, and it tells three lies. It omits, projects and flatters.
Why extreme risk cannot be measured
26 June 2026
Can we measure extreme financial risk? Is financial stability only a question of technology and data? Many seem to think so. I disagree.
Everybody working in the financial system has an incentive to increase its complexity, including the regulators
6 December 2025
The almost infinite complexity of the financial system is the main reason why it is so hard to keep it under control. And that complexity is due to everybody that works in the financial system having incentives to increase its complexity, including the regulators.
Supervision and the Illusion of Optimal Risk
11 October 2025
Should supervision be about finding the optimal level of risk? It sometimes seems that way. A sensible idea in portfolio management, less so when applied to supervision.
Of bubbles and crashes
9 October 2025
There are plenty of warnings about a pending stock market crash, alongside a few hopeful voices. The only real uncertainty is when it will happen.
The risk you measure is probably not the risk you care about
1 March 2025
The risk we measure is usually not the risk we care about. Why and does it matter?
Climate risk does not affect systemic financial risk
22 February 2025
Climate risk is not a systemic financial risk. Folding it into financial regulations will likely backfire, not mitigate climate damage and even increase systemic risk.
Risk and scientific socialism
25 January 2025
Modern financial risk forecasting has much in common with scientific socialism, relying on pseudoscientific models that can create a false sense of security. Effective risk management requires acknowledging these limitations.
The one-in-a-thousand-day problem
24 December 2024 · VoxEU.org
Financial crises usually inflict the most damage when banks suddenly shift from pursuing profits to survival. This column argues that such drastic behavioural changes render statistical analyses based on normal times ineffective. That is why we cannot predict the likelihood of crises, or what banks will do during those crises. Since this behaviour arises from a natural desire for self-preservation, it cannot be regulated away.
Which is better, ES or VaR?
30 November 2024
Almost everyone insists that Expected Shortfall (ES) is superior to Value-at-Risk (VaR). But is that truly the case?
Risk forecasting models are least reliable when needed the most
23 November 2024
When measuring model risk with risk ratios, we find it highest when markets are in turmoil. In other words, model risk is highest, and the risk forecasting models least reliable, when they are needed the most.
On the ideal properties of risk measures
8 November 2024
What are the ideal properties of risk measures? Should we disregard VaR because it is not subadditive? Did the Basel Committee make a mistake by moving to ES? And what is the difference between theory and practice?
What genuinely predicts financial crises?
14 October 2024
Only two variables predict financial crises: Credit growth and low risk. Everything else is the consequence of a crisis already happening. It is pointless to look at market prices, VIX, CDS and their ilk. They are only correlated with crises but don't predict them.
Why so many crises happen when we know why they happen and how to prevent them
30 May 2024 · VoxEU.org
Financial crises are not complicated, and many claim to know why they happen and how to prevent them. Why then do they happen with such alarming frequency? This column argues that a key reason is failures in regulation, and proposes that the financial authorities instead adopt a fundamental concept from finance – diversification. By doing so, we can build a more resilient system that not only better absorbs shocks but is also more efficient and less susceptible to crises than the current frameworks.
When risk models hallucinate
3 February 2024 · VoxEU.org
Risk model hallucination happens when models are forced to forecast the likelihood of extreme events in cases where they have not been trained with such extreme outcomes. This is surprisingly common in applications such as financial regulations, pension funds, reinsurance, as well as the containment of market upheaval and financial crises. This column argues that measuring systemic financial risk needs to acknowledge the changing behaviour of agents and institutions during periods of market stress. This approach is more challenging and difficult to formalise, but crucial for learning how to develop financial resilience.
On the perils of regulating an infinitely complex financial system
17 May 2023
The financial system is infinitely complex, so the supervisors can only patrol a small part of it, why it is so hard to regulate finance effectively.
Buffers or shock absorption in regulating finance
15 April 2023
There are two main approaches to macroprudential regulations. The first is the current one of identifying all risks and using them to build buffers against shocks. Alternatively, shock absorption can be used to boost resilience. Which is better?
What Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse tell us about financial regulations
25 March 2023 · VoxEU.org
The downfall of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse has exposed failures in how we regulate the financial system. This column argues that the problems we now see in the system have arisen because the financial authorities have been trying to do the impossible: maintain growth while keeping inflation under control and financial stability high. The best way forward would be to focus on shock absorption and moral hazard, not the current approach of buffers and risk measurements.
Lessons from the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank
15 March 2023 · LSE Business Review
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank shows that banks still pose risks. Are they systemic? While it is unlikely that the failure of SVB will lead to a crisis, it shows us that the financial system is much more fragile than the public had been led to believe.
Is risk a fate or a choice?
15 December 2022
The prevailing view seems to be that financial risk is a fate not a choice. Even ChatGPT thinks so. As we manage our financial affairs, we are in control. Risk is a choice. True?
The magic of riskometers
10 December 2022
The way financial risk is measured is by a device I have called the riskometer. It is a fantastic thing, plunge it into the bowels of the City of London and out pops a single accurate measurement of risk. Magical. But does it work in practice?
How to manipulate risk forecasts and not get caught
19 November 2022
It is easy to manipulate risk forecasts. If your regulator or compliance officer sets a risk target you don't like, just tell them what they want to hear while continuing doing what you want.
Perceived and actual risk
12 November 2022
Perceived risk is risk predicted by models, and actual risk is the fundamental underlying risk. We measure perceived risk and care about the actual risk. Those two are negatively correlated with interesting consequences.
The McNamara fallacy and the financial Authorities
5 November 2022
We missed the excessive build-up of risk before 2007 despite having all the numbers and models right in front of us. Now we have doubled down on models and numbers. Have the Authorities fallen for the McNamara fallacy?
Climate risk and financial risk
22 October 2022
Systemic risk and climate change strongly affect each other. Unfortunately, a lot of research promising to tell how, does no such thing. Because of a fundamental misunderstanding of what risk is and how financial institutions operate.
Who believes risk can be measured?
8 October 2022
I have long argued that risk, especially extreme risk, cannot be measured. A lot of people disagree. Who are they?
Why the risk you measure is probably not the risk you care about
26 September 2022
The risk we measure is usually not the risk we care about. Why and does it matter?
Sanctions, war, and systemic risk in 1914 and 2022
10 March 2022 · VoxEU.org
The Western countries have sanctioned Russia in a way not applied to any globally integrated major power in over a century, ever since 1914. This column argues that there are lessons to be learned from the 1914 systemic crisis and that high inflation and government debt will make it difficult to contain a crisis today if one emerges.
How global risk perceptions affect economic growth
13 January 2022 · VoxEU.org
The relationship between financial risk and economic growth is complex. This column finds that perceptions of high risk unambiguously harm growth, while perceived low risk has an initial positive impact, which eventually turns negative. Global risk has a stronger effect on growth than local risk, via its impact on capital flows, investment, and debt-issuer quality, challenging monetary policy independence.
Misleading concepts of risk
30 August 2021
A common misconception maintains that different notions of risk capture the same concept: VaR, ES and volatility all measure the same "true" risk". In the same way as like Celsius, Fahrenheit and Kelvin all tell the same thing, only on a different scale. Not true.
The risk management ritual
12 July 2021
Financial risk management has become ritualised. It is more important to follow the correct procedures than to control essential risks. Why and what does it mean for us?
Misleading measurements and garbage in - garbage out models of systemic risk
23 May 2021
There are many measurements of systemic risk and a huge number of papers depend on those measurements. But is that work of any use? There is an archetypical story from May 1944 where the staff of General Eisenhower called up the Army's meteorological office to ask for the weather forecast for Normandy on June 6. The meteorologists responded by saying, “Any weather forecast a month in the future is meaningless.” The response from the general's staff was: “Yes, we know that, but we need a number for planning purposes.”
Riskometers and their inconsistencies
10 April 2021
Risk measurements are quite inconsistent. Does that matter, and how to interpret the results?
Global market risk
14 February 2021
There are a million ways to measure financial risk, and if one wants to calculate global risk, it requires a truly heroic set of assumptions. But it's much easier to calculate global market risk, and that is what I set myself to do below.
On the future of Amazon
13 February 2021
As Amazon continues its exponential growth, where will it all end? Growth has to stop, but when and why?
Moral hazard, the fear of the markets, and how central banks responded to Covid-19
28 January 2021 · VoxEU.org
While the direct economic consequences of Covid-19 have been significant, the impact on the financial markets has been more nuanced. This column uses a unique data set on the financial markets’ fears and perceptions of long-run financial risk to identify how Covid-19, and particularly Fed policy responses to Covid-19, affected global market fears. While some Fed interventions had little or no impact on market fear, the most powerful were the US dollar swap lines, which strongly reduced the perceived likelihood of global market losses decades into the future. The results suggest that the Fed's relative global role has been strengthened, possibly at the cost of increased moral hazard.
Of Julia and R
3 May 2020
I just tried the same code in R's data.tables and Julia's DataFrames, and the results are a bit surprising.
The five principles of correct riskometer use
27 April 2020
It is easy to criticise risk forecasting, but it's rather pointless unless one can come up with proposals. Here are my five principles for the correct use of riskometers.
The problem with Backtesting
25 April 2020
Backtesting is the magical technique that tells us how well a forecast model works. Test the model on history, and we have an objective way to evaluate how good the model is. But does it really work in practice?
The coronavirus crisis is no 2008
26 March 2020 · VoxEU.org
Many comparisons have been made between the coronavirus crisis and the global systemic crisis in 2008. This column argues that seen through the lens of exogenous and endogenous risk, these two crises are quite different. Coronavirus is unlikely to cause a global systemic crisis, and the policy response should be different.
The dissonance of the short and long term
12 August 2019 · VoxEU.org
The type of risk we most care about is long-term, what happens over years or decades, but we tend to manage that risk over short periods. This column argues that the dissonance of risk is that we measure and manage what we don't care about and ignore what we do.
The 2018 market in a 250 year context
31 December 2018
The financial markets did not have a good 2018 as the media kept on reminding us:
Short and long-term risk
3 December 2018
The riskiest year in human history was 1962. The year of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest we ever came to a nuclear war. The mother of all tail events, where all prices go to zero. Volatility that year was average — 16.5%
Low risk as a predictor of financial crises
26 March 2018 · VoxEU.org
Reliable indicators of future financial crises are important for policymakers and practitioners. While most indicators consider an observation of high volatility as a warning signal, this column argues that such an alarm comes too late, arriving only once a crisis is already under way. A better warning is provided by low volatility, which is a reliable indication of an increased likelihood of a future crisis.
Yesterday's mini crash in a historical context
6 February 2018
The stock market had a mini crash yesterday. So how big was that in a historical context?
Here be dragons
7 October 2017
Medieval mapmakers noted the risk of an unknown kind by “here be dragons”. Attempts at measuring extreme risk should come with a similar warning. Just like the sailors of yesteryear, financial institutions will go into unknown territories and, just like the map makers of the earlier era, modern risk modellers have little to say.
VIX, CISS and all the political uncertainty
3 October 2017
Two widely used indicators of financial risk, the VIX index and the ECB's CISS are at a historical low. The (financial) world must be really safe. However, that doesn't square with all the newspaper headlines screaming political uncertainty. What gives?
Why it doesn't make sense to hold bonds
27 June 2016 · VoxEU.org
Investor demand for bonds is very high. This column argues that this is surprising because under almost any likely inflation scenario, including central banks merely hitting their target inflation rates, bondholders suffer large losses. The beneficiaries are sovereign and corporate borrowers; the losers are pension funds, insurance companies and some foreign exchange reserve funds. Meanwhile, the systemic risk from a bond crisis is increasing.
Big Banks' Risk Does Not Compute
24 May 2016
A Bloomberg piece that cites our work, Big Banks' Risk Does Not Compute.
Of tail risk
12 March 2016
Suppose one cares about tail risk, what is the best way to estimate it? There are two, not mutually exclusive, ways; statistical and structural. Which is right?
Models and regulations and the political leadership
27 February 2016
Why do the regulatory authorities seemingly fall into the category of model believers, if not quite to the view that there must be one true model? Well, it is sort of inevitable the way the regulatory process works.
Why do we rely so much on models when we know they can't be trusted?
26 February 2016
There a lot of evidence that models are less than perfectly reliable. Why then do we rely so much on models in decision-making, and especially financial regulations? Because there are three types of people: Believers in true model, skeptics who accept model risk and nihilistic rejectionists.
Does a true model exist and does it matter?
25 February 2016
When designing models, the underlying assumption is often that the model captures the true data generating process. Does a true model exist? To me, the question is completely irrelevant.
Volatility, financial crises and Minsky's hypothesis
2 October 2015 · VoxEU.org
Impact of the recent market turmoil on risk measures
28 August 2015
Last January I looked at how the Swiss FX shock affected the most popular risk measures. Events of the past week give us another interesting test. My daily risk forecast shows the various risk measures for a number of assets, but focus on the SP-500, and the following picture taken from the site today:
Objective function of macro-prudential regulations
24 July 2015
I have been in a conference for the past few days, and have seen a few presentations on macropru type regulations.
Regulators could be responsible for next financial crash
21 July 2015
LSE report warns that forcing financial institutions to forecast risk in the same way could mean they will all end up being caught unawares.
Market moves that are supposed to happen every half-decade keep happening
14 May 2015
Bloomberg today had an interesting piece, called Market Moves That Are Supposed to Happen Every Half-Decade Keep Happening. Here is their self-described "terribly simplistic list"
Why risk is hard to measure
25 April 2015 · VoxEU.org
Regulators and financial institutions increasingly depend on statistical risk forecasting. This column argues that most risk modelling approaches are highly inaccurate and confidence intervals should be provided along with point estimates. Two major approaches, value-at-risk and expected shortfall are compared, and while the former is found to be superior in practice, it is also easier to be manipulated by forecasters.åÊ
The Danish FX event
9 March 2015
Denmark had a small FX event on March 20, in the context of the Swiss FX shock, it is not much a of an event, but it does reinforce stereotypes.
What do ES and VaR say about the tails
9 February 2015
So, does ES capture tail risk, but VaR not? Therefore the Basel committee is correct, and we all should use ES. Is that true?
What the Swiss FX shock says about risk models
18 January 2015 · VoxEU.org
The Swiss central bank last week abandoned its euro exchange rate ceiling. This column argues that the fallout from the decision demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of the regulator-approved standard risk models used in financial institutions. These models under-forecast risk before the announcement and over-forecast risk after the announcement, getting it wrong in all states of the world.
On the Swiss FX shock
9 January 2015
Just looked again at the what I did on the January 2015 Swiss FX shock, looking at how the various risk measures performed in the days after the event, and also looking at the risk of the inverse FX.
Model risk: Risk measures when models may be wrong
8 June 2014 · VoxEU.org
Risk forecasting is central to financial regulations, risk management, and macroprudential policy. This column raises concerns about the reliance on risk forecasting, since risk forecast models have high levels of model risk - especially when the models are needed the most, during crises. Policymakers should be wary of relying solely on such models. Formal model-risk analysis should be a part of the regulatory design process.
The appropriate use of risk models: Part II
17 June 2011 · VoxEU.org
Financial risk models have been widely criticised for both theoretical and practical failures, especially during the recent financial crisis. In the second of two columns, the authors outline why the shortcomings of risk models matter before making suggestions for how the financial industry and supervisors should use models in practice.
The appropriate use of risk models: Part I
16 June 2011 · VoxEU.org
Risk models are at the heart of the financial sector's self-monitoring as well as supervision by regulators. This column, the first of two, addresses the question of how risk models are misused in practice by practitioners and supervisors alike. This misuse causes risk management to fail when it is most needed.
Risk and crises: How the models failed and are failing
18 February 2011 · VoxEU.org
Financial models are widely blamed for underestimating and thus mispricing risk prior to the crisis. This column analyses how the models failed and questions their prominent use in the post-crisis reform process. It argues that over-relying on market data and statistical forecasting models has the potential to further destabilise the financial system and increase systemic risk.